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I: INTRODUCTION 
Wes ter n man has great prid e in his political institutions, which 
with some justificatio n he holds to be the first to recognize the rule of 
law as s uperior to the rule of men. Thus it was with great confidence 
in his la ws and the r e ctitu de of his ways that the first Europeans occu-
pied Africa. The impact of this inv asion upon the indigenous popula-
tions of Africa was tremendous. Every facet of African life, its 
social, polit ical, economic and legal systems were affected. 
A s tudy of Bantu customary law has to dep e nd largely on 
secon d ar y material, because until recent time s, the law of Bantu 
, ,, 
Africa '''wa s largely unwritten. A number of monographs have been 
written by anthropologists in the field, but few of them give more 
than a ch apt er to an examination of the law s and their power of 
sanction as exercised by the courts. Yet it is the courts that are 
the precursors of legislation, and ultimately, legisl ation is the 
1 
province of the state . ''It was the court really that launched the 
::::: 
Bantu, for the purpose of this pap e r, refers to the group of 
peopl e o f South ern Africa whose language is a member of the Bantu 
linguistic grou p. Examples and supporting evid e nce for the paper 
w ill b e dr aw n from among the Tswana, Sotho, Barotse, Kikuyu and 
Thonga with occasional ref ere nces to th e Pondo and the Yao. 
1 . 
H e nry Sumner Mame, Ancient Law (New York: Henry Holt 
and Co., 188 8), p. 4££. 
2 
'state' for it wa s in th e court that the sentiment of etatism, with all 
its devotio n a n d loyalties, was first nurtured. 112 
To do full justice to the topic at least minimal field work is 
neces sa ry. As this is not a reasonable possibility at the present 
time, I am offer ing the following as a tentative thesis pending veri-
fication in t he field. To narrow the focus, I am using examples 
from certain selected tribal groups as listed below. Due to the 
nature of the sources, all the evidence centers on territories that 
have at one time or another been subject to :3ri tish dominion. This 
is not a limitation, howev er, for should onl! become involved with 
any of tho s e territori es colonized by the Belgians or French, for 
example, t h e y would be forced to introduce comparisons between the 
British Common Law and the Roman Civil Codes , as used by the 
latter. Such comparisons would only cloud the main is sue. 
The intrusion of the European into Bantu Africa often had a 
destruct ive effect upon the laws and customs of the people, In spite 
of this however, the Customary Law of Bantu Africa was to prove 
resilient, and still remains a potent force- -though with modifications- -
in the eme r ging nations of Bantu Africa today. 
Th e p aper is divided into four major topics , all of which bear 
on the m ain t heme, which is to determine the irnpact of an alien system 
2 
Will iam Seagle, The History of Law (New York: Tudor 
Publishi n g Co mpany, 1946), p . 65. 
3 
of law up on an indigenous one: first, to understand the nature and 
function of law in society in general; secondly , to discuss some of 
the ways in which the alien European has introduced alternative legal 
principles into Africa; third, to examine some of the forces which 
have tended to undermine traditional law, fore ing it to adapt to 
changed conditions or die out if unable to do so; and fourth, to exam-
ine the status of law in Bantu Africa today. 
4 
II: THE NATURE OF LAW 
A person in a society which prides itself in the law by which 
it was created and to which it adheres should ha ve no difficulty in 
discussing the nature of law. Yet when one is faced with this pro-
position, the task seems to be almost i.Inpossib le, if not highly pre -
sumptuous, especially when one is not even trained in the discipline. 
There 1s no way to evade the issue, however, so that in the manner 
of "fools ," one has to march in where even lawyers fear to tread. 
Though few practitioners have themselves answered the question 
''What is Law ?" to their satisfaction, there are many who have done 
a very adequate job, and it is to them that recourse will be taken. 
The definiti ons which follow come from a variety of sources 
spanning a considerable distance in time. There are several reasons 
for such an approach. First, the law is not something which just 
happened over night. It is a dynamic phenomenon which has been 
evolving since the beginning of human experience and eve n before 
that if o ne regards the law of nature as law . Secondly, there have 
been two major schools of thought in the weste rn world regarding 
the origins of law, and these will become evident in the series of 
definitions which will shortly b e r eco rded. Finally , the law is so 
complex an entity that one cannot begin to comp rehen d its n atur e 
unless one can see it through the eyes of many observers over a 
long span of chronological time. 
5 
The law is like a maze- - it consists of nmnerous intertwining 
parts, and its essence is not easily isolated or understoo d . For 
every defi nitio n, and definitions though restricti ng are a necessary 
part of the law , there is an exception which must be accounted for . 
Similarly, for every legal opinion there may be an equally valid 
dissent and each is a p a rt of the law. Such facto rs are of special 
importance in literate societies where the body of rules governing 
that socie ty are enshrined for all tim e as a m atter of record; but 
they sho uld no t be overlooked when pre-literate societies are under 
consider ation . For though the latter may not rec ord their laws, 
judgrnen ts and variant decisions in writing, they do nonetheless 
carry as much weight when carried down orally as th ey would if 
written, and are enf orced by the authority of the e ld ers or chief, 
depending on t he political make-up of the socie ty in question. 
These matters will again be alluded to in a later chapter when they 
will be discussed in g r eater detail. For the present it is sufficient 
to note that the law is being co nsid ered as a wh ol e without particular 
regard to its sour ce , be it written or unwritten. 
Becaus e Western law owes its origins primarily to the 
Greeks a nd Ro mans, it is from them that the ear li est examp les are 
6 
drawn. These writers saw the law as divinely inspired, immutable 
and incontrovertable. 
There is in fact a true law- -namely right reason- -which is 
in accord ance with natur e, applies to all men, and is un-
changeable and eternal. By its commands this law summons 
men to the performance of their duties; by its prohibitions 
it restr ains them from doin g wrong. Its commands and pro-
hi bitions always influence good men, but are without effect 
upon th e bad. To invalidate this law by human legislation is 
never morally right, nor is it permissible ever to restrict 
its operation, and to annul it wholly is impossible. Neither 
the senate nor the people can absolve us from our obligation 
to obey this law, and it requir es no [ gre at lawyer] to expou nd 
and interpret it. It will not lay down one rule at Rome and 
another at Athens, nor will it be one rule today and another 
tomorrow. But there will be one aw, eternal and unchange-
able , bind ing at all times upon all peoples; and there will be, 
as it were, one common master and ruler of men, namely 
G od, who is the author of this law, its interpreter, and its 
sponsor. The man who will not obey it will abandon his 
better self, and, in denyin g the true nature of man, will 
thereby suffer the severest of penalties, though he has 1 
escaped all the other consequences which men call punishrnent. 
This has also been expressed a s follows: 
The la w is that which all men ought to obey for many reasons, 
but above all because eve ry law is an invention and gift of the 
god s, a tenet of wise men, a corrective of errors voluntary 
and inv oluntary, and a general covenant of the whole state, in 
a ccordan ce with which all men in that state ought to regulate 
h . 1· 2 t e1r 1ves. 
l 
Cicero, "On the Commonw e alth, 11 {trans. S abine and Smith, 
1 950), pp. 215- 216, in The Am e r ican Legal System: Its Dynamics 
and Lim its by Steph en Ford, (St. Paul , Minn.: West Publishing 
Company , 197 0). pp . 3-4. I am indebted to Stephen Ford for this 
historical analys is of the law, from which the next six definitions 
are also taken. 
2 
Demosth enes , "Oration against Aristogition," (1935), p. 525, 
in Ford, p. 4. 
7 
Purs ui ng the natural aspec t s of the law still further we note the 
comments of another in the fourth century B. C. who remarked: 
By 'parti cular' la w I mean that which an individual community 
lays down for i tself . .. ; a nd by 'universal' law I mean the 
law of nature. For the r e 1s a natural and universal notion of 
rig ht
3
an d wron g, on e which a ll m en instinctively apprehend 
The mora l or natura l as p ects o f the la w, as though God given, were 
still of great importa n ce d ur in g th e se vent e enth century and inspired 
such definit ion s as, 11 La w i s a rule of mor al action o bl ig ing to that 
which is right. 114 Only w it h t h e n inetee nth cen t ury did man begin to 
see the law in the way that h e d oe s now, namel y as a ''rul e of civil 
conduct prescribed by the suprem e p o wer in a s tate, commanding 
5 
what i s right, and p rohibiting what is w r ong. 11 Yet even this has a 
slight t inge of the moral abou t it, which was no t to be removed until 
our own century w hen la w h as b ee n defined as 1 1 • • • th e sum of th e 
6 
compuls ory rules in force in a Stat e . 11 
The above definitions give s om e idea what the law is, but 
what it does may be even mo re s ig nif ica nt and certainly easier to 
understand. 
3 . Aristotl e, 11 Rhetoric 1373 b. 11 (Cooper trans. 1932), p. 73, 
in Ford. p. 2. 
4 Grotius, 11 De Jure Belle as Pacis, 11 (1625), p. 1, in Ford, p. 4. 
5 Blackston e , 11 Commentaries, 11 (1847), p . 44, in Ford , p. 3. 
6
v on Jh ering , 11 Law as a Means to an E nd. 1 1 (1914), pp. 239-240, 
m Ford, p. 5. 
8 
Th is doin g of some thi ng about dis put es, this doin g of it 
r e asona b ly, is the business o f the law . And th e people w ho 
ha ve th e doin g in charge, whet h er they be judges or sherriffs 
or clerk s or jailers or lawyers, are offi cials of the law. 
Wh at th ese o ffi cia ls do ab out disputes is, to my mind, the 
la w itself. 7 
Everyone at some tune or another ro mes in co ntac t with the law . 
All can ag ree therefo re, that it has some effect on th eir lives, 
whethe r the y choose to obey or d1sc;be y it. For if th ey choose the 
latter , t he y are forced t o sufier the consequenc es. 
A social norm is legal ii its n1.;g1ect or infraction is r egula rly 
met, in threat o r m fact , by the applicat ion of physical force 
by an in dividual or g r olfp possessin g the soc ially recognized 
p rivile ge of so acting. 
There is anot her sid e to the law, however, a m ore posi tive aspect . 
For just as a citiz en is ex pecte d to obey the la w , so too he may use 
it to r e dre ss a wro n g committ ed aga inst his pe rson or property. 
When a citi z en s u es another c ... t:zen in a court, he is not 
obeying the law , he is inv o k in 0 the law as the basis of his 
claiin, and he is u s ing the la w -- le~a l p r oce dur es --to 
e stabli sh the validity of his claim. 
We can see , ther ef or e, that the la w falls into tw o m ajo r categories: 
the one p r e sc riptive-- what one may or may not do - - which is normally 
invok e d by so me const itute d authority (governme nt , state, or chief), 
7 
Lle wellyn, "The Bramble Bush, 11 (1930 ), p. 3, in Ford, p. 5. 
8 
E. Ad amson Hoebel, The Law 0£ Priinit iv e Man, (Cambridge: 
Harvard Univ ersity Pr es s , 195 4 ), p. 28 . 
9 Char les G. Howard and Robert S. Summe rs , Law: Its Nature, 
Functions a nd Limits (Eng lewood Cliffs, New Je r sey: Prentice Hall, 
1965), p. 3. 
9 
and is ge nerall y referred to as the criminal law; the oth er essentially 
descriptive, wh ich m ay be invoked b y almost an yone, and is commonly 
referr e d to as the civil law. While the above is a reflection of the 
view of " W estern" man, the African does not dif fer much in his inter-
pretation o f the question "What is law?" An ad vocat e of the Niger i an 
bar has s aid: "The law of a given communit y i s the body of rules 
1 0 
which are reco gnized as Obligatory by its membe rs. 11 Put another 
way, the law is a means to an end, and its func tion is primarily to 
balance inter ests. 
An issu e causing some argument a nd m isund erstanding in a 
discu ss ion of the nature of law is the distinctio n sometimes made 
betw een custom and law. On occasion, when the traditional law of 
a people is un der discussion, commentators will tend to downgr~de 
it by dism is sing it as being merely customary , as though that were 
an inh e rent fault. To do th i s , how eve r, is to misunderstand the 
place of custom in the liv es of people everywhe r e , as well as th e 
formation and development of th e law. 
Law and custom are so close ly inter-rela t e d that it is some-
times difficult to distinguish between the two, but broadly 
speaking the term law is applied to th e appoint e d ru le s for 
the control o f , and sanction ed by, a community. Custom, 
on th e oth er hand, i s lon g es t ablishe d usage, or a f:ractice 
which ha s become habitual and has le g al sanction. 1 
1 OT. 0, Elias, The Nature of African Customary Law (M an-
chester: Man chester University P res s , 1956), p. 55. 
11 
G. M. B . Whitfield, South African Na tiv e L aw , 2nd ed. 
(C ape Town: Juta, 1948), p . 1. 
10 
Marriage provides a useful analogy to distingui sh between custom 
and law. It is cu stomary m Western society to have a wedding cere -
mony of some sort either in a church or a home followed by a recep-
tion with food, drink, dancing, and much revelry. It is the law that 
a marriage certificate be issued by a duly cons tituted authority at 
the time the ceremo ny is performed, without w hich the marriage 
would not be l egal. Thus one can say that laws are rules imposed 
on society as a whole with the weight of legal sanc tion to support 
them; whereas customs, though possibly no les s regulatory in their 
influence on peoples I lives do not have the backi ng of legal sanction. 
Once the y do, however, they can correctly be regarded as laws. 
Look ed at in this way, there need be no confusion as to what is law 
and what is custom, and no need to distinguish between the two, 
down gr ading the one at the expense of the other, for they represent 
two sides of the saln:! coin. Custom is more nearly a state in the 
evolution of the law, a continuing and dynamic process, than an 
alternative phenom enon. 
The modern age of legislation by means of laws deliberately 
set up and expressed in certain authoritative texts covers but 
a very small period of legal history. Preceding it the prin-
c ipl e element in most legal systems wa s custom. 12 
Another commentator has taken this line of though t even further, by 
1 2 
Theodore F. T. Plucknett, 11 A Concise History of the 
Common Law" in Readings in Jurisprudence, ed. Jerome Hall 
(Ind ianap olis: The Bobbs Merrill Company, 1938 ), p. 875. 
11 
suggesting" ... th at to which we give the name Law always has been, 
still is, and will for ever be custom. 11 At the same time he cautions 
that though all law is c ust om, not all custom is law. "Law differs 
13 
from custom as a part differs fr om the whole." 
This short smn mary of some of the major definitions of law 
is by no means to be regarded as the last word on the subject. 
There are many learned writers whose definitions have not been 
included; but those that are should provide an adequate framework 
for an examination of t he next topic under discussion, namely, the 
nature of African Customary L aw. 
13 
Jam es C. Carter, "Law: 
1n Read ings in Jurisprudence, ed. 
Bobbs Merrill Company, 1938), p. 
Its Origin , Growth and Function" 
Jerome Hall (Indianapolis: The 
912. 
12 
III: THE NATURE OF BANTU C USTO MARY LAW 
The function of the law in Bantu society, as in any society, 
is to pre serv e and maintain equilibrium. 1 This aim is carried to 
such an exte nt that punishment for wrongdoing, a strong feature in 
our own l aw, is generally given less importance than retribution 
o f the an ti- bellum status of the two litigants. Thus in African law 
one very oft en finds that emphasis is placed upon compensation for 
a crime comm itted rather than on the punishme nt of the offe nder . 
Let us assume, for example, that a man kills a noth er in a fight. 
The hom icide is clearly not pr emedita ted, yet still a serious crime . 
In our so ciety th e murderer would inevitably be tried and if con-
victed, woul d serve a lengthy pris on term. No t so under Africa n 
Customary law. More likely, he woul d be req uired to pay a fine of 
from 10- 30 co ws or 100 sheep or g oats to the family of the deceased 
as co mpe nsation for their loss. Should the victim be a woman (at 
least in Kikuyu customar y law) th e fine wou ld likely be three co ws 
or 3 0 sheep, wom e n evidently bein g regarde d as being less valuable 
1 
J . H. Drib e r g , "Primitiv e La w in Eastern Africa," Afr i ca : 
Journal of Int ernational Institut e of African La ngu ages and Cultures, 
(1929), p . 49. 
13 
. 2 
to the community. If, however, the murder ca n be rroved to be 
pre-meditated the murderer might be executed . Most traditional 
Bantu societies, howev er , considered the taking of a life for a life a 
wasteful process, so that mor e o ften compensation was paid to the 
chief or elders. This principle was based on the idea that "all 
blood belongs to the chief. 11 
The Bantu by their nature are litigous people. It may be t hat 
all pe op le are natura lly so, though a travele r t o southern Afr ica 
today w ho happened to ::,pend any time at all in the rural areas wo uld 
soon, without any prior knowledge or exper i ence , surmise that the 
propensity for peaceful discussion and argument until a question is 
solved is high amongst th e Bantu. Suc h att ributes, the desire for 
and enjoyment of healthy protracted argument, are th e bas is of 
litigation . This being so, it is not surprising that meetings o f 11 t he 
court, 11 no matt er what form it t oo k , were well attended . It would 
in fact probably be fair to say that t he proceedings of the courts 
occupied in Bantu Africa the same pl ace as the television set does 
in mo de rn Am erica. It was not only the source of information for 
the people as to what was right and what was wrong in terms of the 
law, but also an opportunity for a gathering during which men could 
discuss their problems, the c rops, their plans for the future, and 
2 
Jomo K e nyat te, Facing Mount Kenya (New York: Vintage 
Books}, p. 21 9. 
14 
so forth. This kind of inclusive attitude towards their legal ins ti tu-
tions and by unplication, the laws which they enforce, is unportant. 
It instilled in the African a great respect for the lav., the kind of 
respect which is only possible when the law is an or ganic entity, 
coming from below out of a common need shared by all the people, 
for its power of unification and sanction. For in Bantu society, as 
in any other, a law without sanction is no law; and by the same token 
the sanctioning power of a law is not long effec tive if it is not 
supported by the consent of the peop l e whom it controls. 
A leadir:g writer in the field of African law who has studied 
the operation of the Law among t he Bantu people of Northern Rhodesia, 
now Zambia, has suggested that the concept of the "r easonable man" 
is central to the law of the Barotse. 
The reasonab le man occupies this central position because he 
is the means by which abstract le:fal rules are focused on to 
the varied circumstances of life. 
Though it can be dangerous to infer general trends from particular 
instances, in this case, it appears tenable to suggest that the "reason-
able man" is the centre of all legal systems, including those of the 
Bantu people, of whom th e Barotse are a part. It has been said that: 
3 
Max Gluckman, Order and Rebellion in Tribal Africa, (New 
York : Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 179. Reference should also 
be made to his The Judicial Process Among the Barotse of Northern 
Rhodesia (Manchester: The Univ e rsity Press, · 1955); and to The 
Ideas in Barotse Jurisprudence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1965). 
15 
There h as never been a problem, however difficult, which 
His Maj esty' s judges have not in the end been able to resolve 
by askin g themselves the simple questi on, "Was this or was 
it not con duct of a reasonable man? ", and leaving that 
question to be answered by the jury. 4 
So t oo in Bantu society, one can assume that whenever litigation 
takes place, provided that the action of the defendants are judged 
according to that soc iet ies conception of "reaso nable behavior," 
then the decisio ns reach ed by the j udges will be accepted and enforced. 
This is borne out by Max Gluckman who said : 
In almost every case which I heard in Barotseland litigants and 
witnesses, whether they lied or were mistaken, worked with 
the same moral and legal rules as the ju dges did. This is the 
mark o f a homo geneous society; and it alone allows a satisfac-
tory proc ess of the law. 5 
This in troduces th e problem of morality and the law. Again 
the Barotse, and therefor e by implicati on the Bantu, appear to have 
a very sophisticated vie w on the matter . A Ba rotse maxim states : 
"If you are invited to a m e al and a fishbone sticks in your throat, 
6 you cannot su e your host." This is closely analagous to the Roman 
law injunction of " . volenti non fit injuria," which may be freely 
translated to mean: a man who willingly expose s himself to danger, 
7 
cannot sue for damages if he is subsequently injured. In other 
4
Sir Alan Herbert, quoted in: Max Gluckman, ... Or der 
and R eb ellion, p. 1 79. 
5 
Gluckman, p . 182. 
6
Ibid., p. 197 . 
7 . 
Ibid. 
1 6 
words the law s eeks to impose right and reasona ble action, whereas 
morality seeks right and generous action. And it is well for a man 
to be prodigal in meeting his obligations towards others, while at 
the same tune not insisting on the letter of his rights. 8 
So far I have sought to demonstrate that the role of law among 
the Bantu p_!!ople, with specific reference to the Barotse, is basically 
the maintenance of stability in society , which differs little from our 
own. There are, however , some variati ons; and as these prunarily 
concern matters of procedure, it is to this aspect of the law that I 
shall now turn. 
In th e first place there was seldom a st ructur e which could be 
called a 11 cour t house. 11 In Barotseland, it is t rue, the court mi ght 
meet under some form of s helter, but genera lly a covenient spot 
close to the headman 1 s or chief 1 s hut was suffic ient. A large sha de 
tree, for instanc e, under which the elders might meet to discuss the 
affairs of the village or tribe was often a typica l venue, but whenever 
the chief or elders or judges (depending on the tribe in question) con-
vened the court, there the court was established . Among the Barotse 
there was a sophi sticated system of courts from the highest or chief 1 s 
court down to the lo west village courts. The higher level courts, 
such as that of the Paramount chief, were held under cover, but the 
village courts presided over by the headmen were norma ll y held in 
8
Ibid., p. 192. 
1 7 
9 
the open. Am on g the Ts w ana trials were held in the open and in 
public, but women were not normally allowed to attend unless 
directly involved. 1 O The Sotho are reported as having had as many 
as 1300 courts of one sort or another, ranging from the relatively 
informal gatherings of headmen and a few advisers up to the "Supreme 
Court'' of the land presided over by the Paramo unt Chief and divided 
into five permanent courts which s at at Matsieng , and as many as 
three on circuit. 11 The Paramoun t chief of the Thong a was responsible 
for all legislative, executive and judicial powers which he enacted with 
the aid of several counselors. He was the supreme authority of the 
l 2 
nation and his decisions were without appeal. 
The above being all ex a mpl e s of chiefly societies, it is well 
also to consider an ac ephalous soci e ty. The Kikuyu preferred to 
settle all minor disputes in t h e home, and only if the father with the 
aid of arbitrators - -normally the plaintiff's kinfolk- -was unable to 
bring about an equitable settlement in the case, was it referred to 
the gene ral assembly or public court of elders. 13 
9Gluckman, The Judical Process among the Barotse, Chap. I. 
10 
Isaac Schap era, A Handbook of Tswana Law and Custom, 2nd 
ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 287-288. 
11 
Hugh Ashton, Th e Basuto, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1967), p. 222. 
12 
Henri A. Junod, The Life of a South African Tribe, Vol I: 
Social Life (New York: Union Book s Inc., 1962), p. 434. 
13 
Kenyatta, pp. 205 - 206. 
18 
The mann er of :r:,resenting a case at court did not vary much 
between societies, whether chiefly or acephal ous. Of the latter it 
was merely said that the court of el ders would meet at the request 
of the plaintiff to hear th e case. The pla inti ff w ould state his case 
using twigs to keep a rec ord of the points he had raised wh ich in 
effect was the court reco rd. The defendant would answ er these 
claims point by point. Once complete, the ndunda or judgment 
committee would declare its judgment, and if both parties agreed 
h 1 d 14 ' k . h T . 1 t e case was c ose . L1 ew1se, among t e swana, a typ1ca 
chiefly society , the plaintiff's res pons ibility wa s to open the case by 
brin gi ng it befor e the court, though in much the same way as among 
the Kikuyu , he was expected fir st to attempt a settlement out of cou rt. 
Fairly standard pro ced ure among all societies was the hier-
archy of the courts. Thus a case had to be heard a t the village level 
by th e headman or the village elders before it could be moved on to 
the chie f's court, and then only if satisfaction was not achieved at 
15 
the lower level. Neither party w as expected to make any kind of 
oath, but both were expected to tell the truth. Among the Sotho it 
was said of a lying witness: "The questions have defeat ed him. 1116 
Perjury, how ever, was not regarded as a grave crime, though it 
14 
Kenyatta, p. 208. 
15 
Schap era, p. 285. 
16 
Ash ton, p. 242. 
19 
may have been punished by the imposition of a fine. Once the plain-
tiff had introduced his case, which he might do at great length, 
calling on witnesses to bear out his testimony, the time wa s handed 
over to the defendant who would generally deny the whole story, 
providing all kinds of alibis to prove his innocence. Professional 
advocates wer e rare ly a feature of traditional Ban t u court proceed-
ings, tho ugh there are records among the Sotho of wealthy lit igan ts 
hiring pr ofessiona l pleaders. These men, known as akhente, were a 
1 7 
rare innov ation and "contrary to traditional practice and theory." 
In fact among the Pondo, advocates were villified and called igqwetha, 
18 
which freely tr anslated means perverter of the truth. Despite the 
lack of advocates, however, cross-examination was both vigorous 
and thorough. When both the plaintiff and the defen d ant had stat ed 
their cases, the judges would examine the witne ss es. Eye-witness 
accounts were always given greater weight than hearsay evidence, 
though the lat ter was also admissible. Following the cross-exam-
ination of witness es, which in Kikuyu courts was carr ied out by tw o 
elders appointed by the court, anyone was allow ed to j oin in the 
discussion. 19 Then, once all th e evidence had b ee n heard and 
l 7 Ibid. , p. 234. 
18 . H . C Moni ca unter, Reaction to onquest: 
with Europeans upon the Pondo of South Africa, 
Oxford Univ ersity Press, 1961 ), p. 426. 
1 9 Kenyatta, pp. 211- 212. 
Eff ects of Contact 
2n d ed. (London: 
20 
discu s sed, a committ ee of elde rs was appointed to decide the case. 
Each litigant could choose two elders to represent them on this 
committee. Var ious cu rse s and ritual oaths were taken by both 
parties to ensure that the judgment of the kiama (court) would be 
respected and obeyed. 
The fear of public opm10n expressed in the way of curses 
was the chief preventative of mi schief and crime, because 
there was no police or ganizatio n in the Gikuyu society. 20 
Not only were the litigants expect.:: ~d to take these oaths, but so were 
the j udges. 
Oath or ordeal was the most important factor con -
tro lling court procedur es . It served two purposes. On 
the one hand, the fear of 1t p revented people fro m giving 
f alse evidenc e, and helped to bring the offenders to j ustic e 
t hrough guilty conscience and confess ion. On the other 
hand, it ru led out bribery and co rruption and ensured im-
. 1 b' d . d 21 partia or un 1ase JU gment . 
While it will b e noted that among the Kikuyu an oath was administered, 
it was not quit e in the manner of a witness promising to tell "the 
truth, th e whole truth, and nothing but the truth, .11 but rather a more 
inclusive one w hich inv olved the whole court, judge and judged a l ike. 
Just as the procedural aspects of the law of the Bantu societies 
exa1nine d are mor e fl exi bl e th an those of the European societies wh ich 
were later to coloni ze Southern Africa, so too, the: substantive e le-
ments of their l aws seem to be s impler and in their simplicity more 
20 
Ibid., pp. 212- 214. 
21 
Ibid. 
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equitable . It has been seen, for instance, that greater emphasis 
was placed upon restitution and compensation than punishment even 
with regard to capital crimes. The Thonga, like all the other Bantu 
societies referred to, make a distinction between premeditated and 
accidental murder. The former was generally, though not always, 
settled by the execution of the murderer. However, should the 
offender commit his crime involuntarily, his offense could normally 
be ameliorated by presenting a girl from his family (a daughter, 
niece, or sister) to the bereaved family. Should the girl subsequ e ntly 
produce a child, thus restoring the balance between the two families, 
she was free to return home. If, as sometimes happened, a member 
of the family of adoption wished to marry her, then lobola or bride 
wealth had to be paid . Thus, " . . . a cow whic h has calved is not 
22 
used to pay a fine; the calf pays it." 
With this kind of an outloo k on capital crimes, especially 
murder, it is not surprising to find that the Bantu people have an 
essentiall y "reasonable" substantive means of dealing with theft. 
The Thong a, and in this respect they are not atypical, condemn 
theft not so much for being anti-social, but as being disrupting to 
society. The concept of individual property is at the base of the 
entire Bantu syst em. They are agriculturalists and consider the 
products of th eir labour to be their own, to which no one else is 
2 2 Junod, pp. 441-442. 
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entitled without prior permission. Yet, if a man is hungry and in 
passing a field of mealies happens to take one to roast and eat 
before going on his way, he is not considered guilty of theft by the 
Thonga, provided he leaves some sort o f mar k . An example is 
cited in which a fellow took a mealie cob from the field of his friend, 
but before leaving drew a line in the earth from the site to the edge 
of the field, the re leavin g the now useless stalk. Of him it was 
said: "A thie f leaving hastily would not have time to dra w the 
23 
lin e . . . " and he was :10t prosecuted. Where a theft was proven 
intentiona l how ever, the offender would be ordered to pay compensa-
tion to the offen ded, equal to the value of the go ods stolen. 
In som e soci et ies, i. e . Kik uyu, perpet ual thi eves were 
treated very harshly, even to the extent of bei ng publicly exec ut ed 
by stoning or burning, for in Kikuyu society at least, recidivism 
d d . 24 was regar e as very dangerou s to society. Recidivism was 
treated with l ess violen ce among the Sotho, wh o w ou ld merely impose 
an addit ional fine of ten head of stock on the habit ua l criminal whic h, 
if he was unable to pay, resulted in his being summoned before the 
. 25 
the court of th e Paramount chief. 
corn on the cob 
23 
Ibid., p . 446 . 
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K enyatta, p . 221 . 
25 
Asht on, p. 26 7. 
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Sorcery was the most heinous of crime s in the Bant u hierarchy, 
supersed ing even murder, because none was considered more socially 
disru ptive. Ma gic, on th e other hand, was usually sanctioned by the 
law as a means of de te rmining the guilt of an otherwise unapprehen-
dable cr iminal. The Tswana distinguished b e tween sorcerors, baloi, 
and professiona l mag icians, called dingaka. The latter were and 
still are looke d up to as useful members of society. Sorcerers, 
howeve r, who were usu ally women, we r e regarded as evil and the 
perpetra tors o f evil. Thus fell to the magicians the task of identi-
fying the sor cerors so that they could be rooted out. Take the 
example of a man who has fallen ill. A magician would be called in 
to determ in e t he cause of the illness. Should so r cery be suspected, 
the magician would describe the totems by which the sorcerer could 
be ident ified, and once found he/ she would be called in to make the 
man we ll agai n. Fa ilu re to do this would result in a s e nt e nce of 
26 death for th e suspecte d sorceror. No aspect of Bantu law has 
been mo r e misun de rstood than the part play ed by ''witchcraft, 11 and 
the rationale of pun ishment und e r lying it. Just how misunderstood 
it was, and th e re s ults that this was to have upon the law once the 
European got his ha nd s on it will be dealt wit h at greater length in 
the ne xt c hapt er . 
26 
Sch apera, pp. 275-278. 
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Personal law, specifically the marriage law, is the next 
topic for examination. It has been said that in African society: 
Marriage ... is a contract ostensibly between two families, 
in which the individual inter est s of the groom and bride, 
though implicitly or formally recognized, are but a sub-
ordinate element of the wider dominating interests of their 
families ... 
An A frican contract of marriage is in fact a triple 
agreement. First, there is the primary, legal contract 
between the boy and girl as the only true partners to the 
marriage relationship . Then, there is the secondary, 
social contract between the two families of the couple. 
Finally, there is the ancillary, soc io-legal contract for 
the settl ement of the marriage payment which puts the 
seal of enforceabilit y on the entire transaction. 27 
Th e socio-legal contract, severally kn own as bride-prince, bride-
wealth, or lobola, is another feature of African (Bantu) custom, 
which w ith tim e has developed the att ributes of law and has been 
totally misunderstood by Europeans, especially missionaries. Far 
from being a transaction by which the body of the bride was purchased, 
it had the function of first, legitimatizing the union, and secondly, 
compensating the bride's parents for their loss. To understand the 
significance of the latter one must realize that in Bantu society 
there ex isted a definite division of labor between men and women, 
the latter bein g resp o nsible for agricultural production. Thus the 
loss of an able- bodied daughter might be serious in the context of 
of the e xtended family unless some form of compensation was received. 
27 
Elias, pp. 146-148. 
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Among the Tswana adultery was generall y settled out of court, 
but if pre gnancy resulted, then the offender was usually fined, and 
the husband had custody of the child. In order to be awarded compen-
sation, however, the husband had to catch his wife's lover red-handed. 
Further, though a husband could exact a confess ion from his wife, his 
case was regarded as unfounded if he had been away from home for any 
length of time, for examp le, more than two years. Should an unmarried 
girl be seduced and subsequently become pregnant, her lover would be 
subject to a heavy fine e quivalent to the lo bola price, which was payable 
to the girl's fath er as compensation for his loss. An unmarried girl 
who has already borne a child carried a far lower brideprice than a 
virgin. But if the girl failed to report her seduction immediately, 
thus indicating that she had enjoyed and/or encouraged it, the fine 
imposed would likely be considerably reduced. 28 
28 Schapera, pp. 264-268. 
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N: THE BRITISH IMPACT UP ON THE 
BANTU CUSTOMARY LAW 
The primary impact of the British upon the Bantu customary 
law was in the overt im pos ition of th eir own codes and common law 
on the peoples whom they conquered. In South Africa for instance, 
Roman -Dutch law was imposed from an early date by the first settlers. 
This form was maintained by the British following th e annexation of 
the Cape Province and was taken into Rhodesia nearly eighty years 
later. The sa me was true to a lesser extent for the former Protec-
torates , notab ly Botswana and Le s otho. At the same time the 
British also introduced th ei r own comm on law, so that now one has 
over a c onsid er a ble part of So u thern Africa what has been described 
as a form of Anglo-Roman-Dutch-Common-Law, or a common 
civil-law . 
1 
Meanwhile, in keeping with the British policy of Indirect 
2 
Rule, th e nat ive customary laws were as far as pass ible preserved. 
They we r e to be used whenever applicable, in cases involving parties 
who we re both Afr i cans, and only as long as such laws were "not 
l 
A. N. Allott, "Towards th e Unification of Laws in Africa," 
The International a nd Comparative Law Quarterl y , XN (1965), p. 372. 
2 
The con cept of indirect rule was first formulated by Lord 
Freder ick Lu ga rd and becam e t he official policy of all British admin-
istrations in colonial Afric a . Putting it crudely, indirect rule meant: 
divide and rule. 
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repugnant to natur al justic e , equity, and good conscience. 113 This 
dua l concept of the law, one for the whites and one for the blacks, 
is still the subject of much controversy among legalists in South 
Africa. A notable critic recently attacked this dual policy as one 
designed solely to per pe tuate apartheid, being of no value whatso-
4 
ever in promoting justice and eq uity for all subjects of the state. 
His contentions were strongly challenged by another critic, who 
pointed out that the African, far from being discriminated against 
is given the benefit of t he doubt. He is allowed to appear in a statu-
tory court in the event that his case involves a member of another 
race, whereas the European is automatically barred from appearing 
ma traditional African court, no matter what the circumstances of 
5 
the case are. 
Of almost as great an impact has been the influence of alien 
procedural methods upon traditional systems of law . In territories 
such as Botswana and Lesotho, but also Zambia, Rhodesia, and 
Kenya, statutory law was derived from enactments passed by local 
legislatu res with metropolitan governments taking a back seat. 
3 T . 0 .. Elias, "Notes: Form and Content of Colonial Law II, 11 
The Inte rn ational and Comparative Law Quarterly, N(October 1955), 
p. 534. 
4 
R. S. Suttner, 11 Legal Pluralism m South Africa, " Ibid. , 
XIX (January 1970), p. 134-153. 
5 L. Lazar, ''Legal Centralism in South Africa, 11 Ibid., (July 
1970), p. 492-507. 
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This law was largely administered by the colonial courts. A second 
body of subsidiary statutes were administered by the native courts, 
and were derived from rules made by Native Administrators acting 
under statutory authority . A final body of law emanated from the 
villages and na tive communities and was prirrlarily administered by 
native courts in traditional fashion, but linked by appeal to the colon-
ial courts. In this way control was effecti vely maintained in the hands 
of the colonial rulers. 6 Little has changed since independence, only 
now the power is in the hands of the locally elected African leaders 
instead of the alien colonial administrators, and the dual system still 
persists . 
An excellent example of the kind of problem that arises out of 
the operation of a dual courts system is given in the case of Grabber 
vs Lisambo as reported in 1964. 7 The defendant, an African, while 
delivering meat to a certain household, was bitten by the plaintiff's 
dog. He had entered the property of the plaintiff in the hope of deter-
mining the whereabouts of the house he was seeking, by asking the 
plaintiff's servant for direction s. The court of first instance, a 
multi-racial Local Court, found for the defendant, ordering the 
6 
Lord Hailey, An African Survey: A Study of the Problems 
Arising in Africa South of the Sahara, Revised, 1956, (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 601. 
7 
Philip A. Thomas, "J.B. Grabber v. J. Lisambo," The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, XV III, (April 1969 ), 
p. 471-477. 
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plaintiff to pay damages amounting to th r ee pounds (about $8). Th e 
case unde r review was the plaintiff's appeal, he was a white man, 
to the next highes t court, which he won. Lisambo was ordered to 
return the $8 and pay costs . The problem is the age-old one of con-
flict of laws . Th e initial hearing was conducted according to Zambian 
Customary Law, in which the doctrine of strict liability applied to 
dog bite cases. The appeal was heard in terms of the English Common 
Law, in which the doctrine of scienter applies. 8 The appeal courts' 
ruling was predicated on the fact that they considered the lower 
court to hav e erred in failing to establish proof of sc ienter on the part 
of the plaintiff. Yet the lower court had acted in good faith and in 
terms of the Zambian law which states: 
A Local Court shall administer: a) The Afri ca n Customary 
Law applicable to any matter before it in so far as such law 
is not repugnant to natural j ustice or morality or incompatible 
with the provisions of any written law. 9 
The application of customary law in this case would appear to be com-
patib l e with the above requirements. This, however, raises another 
issue. What if every time a case from a lower court is subject to 
r eview, the judge applied new and conflicting principles. Soon the 
8 
Note: The rule of s c ienter means that the intent to do harm 
must first be proved before liability can be established. In other 
words, unless Lisambo could prove that Grabber intended his dog to 
bite him , he had no cause. 
9 Thom as, p. 471 . 
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10 
lower c ourts would become redundant . It is certainly a matter of 
recor d th at in any kind of legal system the Higher courts and courts 
of Appeal have the last w ord, and in no way is it to be inferred that 
this should be otherwi se; but where the Higher court is judging a 
case in term s of one concept of law and the lower court in terms of 
a totally different one, it is clear that sooner or later the two must 
be r econc iled. This does, however, bring into sharp relief the dis-
advantage of operatin g a tiered sys t em , which is a legacy of the 
colonial past. There appears to be no immediate solution for the 
problem either, though eventually some form of unity will have to be 
brought t o th e legal sy s tems of these territories . Law can b e the 
greatest social device for unifying a nation. African nations with 
what are oft en very artificial boundaries , ca used by colonial regimes, 
and encompassing in many cases rnutua lly hostile tribal groups, need 
the unifying aid of uni fied laws more than ever. There is no time to 
let these evolve, as they might ordinarily have done, so that govern-
11 
ment ac tion is imperative. Governme nt action in ear lier times 
created the division as a matter of policy, and only government actio n, 
it s eem s, can bring about the necessary re-unification. 
Of great import a nce too, has b ee n the imposition of laws 
governin g witchcraft and the murd e r of suspected sorcerors, which 
10 
Ibid., p . 4 73. 
11 
Allott, p. 366-369 . 
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to the p r e -literat e A frican may be reg a rded a s a publi c service, but 
to the European is st ill m u r de r. O f w it c h c raft and sorcery it has 
b ee n s a id : ''Th ey a r e not the exot ic thi n g s in A frica that they are to 
u s ; the y ar e p erfectly practical , un derstandable forc e s tha t c an b e 
wielde d to som e extent by almos t anyo n e. 1112 Yet the Europ e an has 
r ele ntle s sly pros ecu t ed all Africans found g u il ty of murdering sus-
pe c te d w itches, which act the hapless plainti ff has seldom sought to 
c once al, think ing in his own way that what he has done was j ustifi e d. 
The c ourts, meanwhile, continued to j u dge suc h off e nd e rs by stan -
da rd s n o r m all y ap p lied to the "Reasonable E n g lislunan, " a pat e ntly 
u nr e a so nabl e premise to judge a tribal Africa n by. " On e c annot 
assert d o gmat ically about custom that it is wro ng. On e c an ass e r t 
13 dogmat i c ally that witchcraft is factually er r one ous." By adh er ing 
rig idly t o English standards of morality and re asona b le be h avior, 
the cou rts h a ve put many suspe c ts in the in v idious position of being 
ju d ged and co n v ict ed for acts that the y d id not even r e gard as wrong, 
let alone c rim in al. 
The pr oblem surrounding the prosec u ti on of witch-murd e r 
arises f rom a basic m i sco n cept i on o n t h e p art of the European 
1 2 
Colin T u rn bu ll, The Lonel y A fr ic an (N e w York: Anchor 
B oo ks , 1963), p . 159 . 
13 
Rob e r t B. Se idm a n, "Me ns Rea and the Reasonabl e African: 
The pre scient ific w o rl d v iew a n d mistake of f act." The Int e rnational 
a n d Corn parat iv e Law Qua r te rly , X V (Oct ober 1965), p. 1139. 
(Mens R ea = The C rimin a l Mind. ) 
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settle r s and magistrates. They failed to appreciate or understand 
the disti nction drawn in the African mind between sorcerors and 
magicians. There was no such thing as witchcraft, they reasoned, 
and killing a person for being a suspect was clea rly a case of pre-
meditated murder. It is not that the African condoned witch-murder. 
There was a long ritual of divination and extra- legal ritual that was 
gone thro ugh by the magician or diviner before the sorceror was 
exposed and even when this was done, the signs were often so 
. 14 
oblique that it was hard to determine the guilt with any certainty. 
Hence, no doubt a number of innocent lives were lost. Yet one can-
not help but feel that a more understanding attitude on the part of 
the early settlers and law-makers would have ameliorated the situ-
ation earlier. Education, not law, was what the pre-literate 
African r eally needed to drive out his superstition. Neither should 
it be forgotten that even in England, which had regarded itself as 
civilized for centuries, suspected witches were hanged as late as 
1 735, and the last recorded hanging of a suspected witch in Western 
. 15 Europe was m 1 782. 
One can see that the effects of the imposition of alien laws 
upon the Bantu have been threefold: first, by the introduction of 
alien codes, in this case Roman-Dutch and English Common-Law, 
14 
Elias, p. 228. 
1 5 
Ibid., p. 127. 
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(these as already indicat ed, tending to merge and form a ki nd of 
A nglo -Civil La w ) ; secondly, by the int roduction of foreign and appar-
ently com pl ex proc edural techniques, particularly with regard to the 
admissibi lity of evid e nce and the us e of professional advocates; and 
finally, by legislation, e specially in the rol e that the statutory 
colonia l courts have pl ayed in prosecuting crim es against the state 
such as witchcraft and witch-murder. 
Another influence that cannot be overlooked is that of the 
missiona ries. In preaching against po lygamy, bride price, and 
inheritan ce of widows, the missionaries attacke d the very core of 
th e "p e rsonal law" of the Bantu, around whic h most liti gat ion 
16 
revolved . It canno t be stressed enough that the customary law of 
the Bant u was, and to a degree still is more "personal" than our 
own . Co mpens ation and restitution are far more important to th e 
Afr ican than retributi on and punishment. In all society the main-
tenan ce of social stab ility is the prime aim of the law. In pre-
European Bantu Africa on e could say that it was the sole aim. 
Certainly, the concept of punishing a w rongdoer without restorin g 
the ant e - be llu m balance, as it were, was com pletel y foreign and 
se em ingly pointl ess. To illustrate t his, an African of the Yao people 
16
Inh eritanc e of widows, means that the brother of the deceased 
has the fi rst option to marry his widow , and so take ov er his property, 
S ee Isaac S ch ap er a, ' ' Th e Develop me nt of Custo mary Law in the Bechuana-
la nd Protec tora te, " The Future of Customa ry Law in Africa, Symposium- -
Collogue, (Lei den: Universitair e P e rs, 1955), p. 106. 
£r01n Nyas alan d, now Ma l awi, has said: 
We nativ es think that hanging is useless . Suppose I kill 
someone, I am hanged, and tomorrow you will hear that 
so meon e has again killed a man. The reason is this: 
when a ma n 's heart has become swollen and he wants to 
kill, he wp.7 kill, without thought for God or Govern-
ment .. 
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Sometimes one is forced to conclud e that the African's "primitive" 
perceptio n of a socia l problem is more enlig htened than our own, 
tempered by a somewhat jaded world-view. 
The policy to da t e of most c o lonial regimes and their 
successo r s, with regard to marriage, divorce, and bride -price, 
has b e en to reco gnize both th e customary law and Christian teaching, 
supported by t he common law and s t atutes. Thus a man can choose 
to marry und er either convention and have his marriage recogni ze d 
as le g al. In fact, many in the past have comprom is ed, and follow-
ing a Ch risti an ceremony , hav e pa id bride-price in order to sea l the 
contr a ct and l egitimatise the offspring. As far as polygamy goes, 
the impac t of a changed econ omic system has been far more per-
vasiv e th an the influence of the missiona ri e s in reducing the inci-
18 dence of this practice, if not eliminating it altogether. Undoubtedly 
a major effect of the E urop ean occupatio n upon African society has 
17 
Marg e ry Perham, Ten Africans, 2nd ed. (Evanston : 
K o rthwes t e rn Univ e r s ity Pres s , 1963) , F rom the story of Amini 
Bin Said i, pp . 146 - 147. 
18 
Ma x Gluckman, The Judicial Process Among the Barotse 
oi Nort hern Rhodesia (Manchester: Man chester University Pr e ss, 
1 955 ), especially chapters I II and VIII. 
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been the introduction of a cash economy. The need to participate 
in this, at first created by the imposition of taxes, like the hut-tax, 
and now largely by their own volition, has caused the African to 
leave his tribal home and seek employment in the cities, in the 
m ines, and on European-owned farms. This has had several results, 
all of wh ich have affe cte d the development of the law and the African's 
view o f its place in society and its po we r over him. 
In moving from his home, often for extended periods of time, 
he has met many p eople with different backgrounds and ideas. In 
many inst ances he has left behind a wife and dependants who them-
selves a re placed in a unique situation quite unknown in pre-colonial 
times. Finally, if and when our hypothetical tribesman does return 
to his home district, it i s with a totally new world-view. In all pro-
bability his cash wealth exceeds that possessed by his headman, or 
even chief, especially if he has worked in the European sector for 
any length of time. 
Many situations ar e record ed which demonstrate the degree 
to which Africans have adapted to changed conditions, one which is 
summariz e d below. This example involves a divorce suit brought 
by a Barotse woman against her husband who had been away at the 
mines for what she consider e d an exce ssively long period of time. 
The kinsmen of the defendant ar gue d on his behalf that he had sent 
her money and blankets all this time, and had in every way been a 
36 
good pr ovider. The court held: 11 ••• that this woman did not marry 
a blanket ... 11 and granted the divorce. Shortly, however, the 
husband returned. Whereupon, wanting his wife back, and she want-
ing him, her father d e manded a second marriage payment for what 
was after all a new marriage. The husband thereupon appealed to 
the court to reverse their previous order granting the divorce, which 
they did, revising an earlier rule on the matter. That rule had 
stated that a woman was entitled to sue for divorce if her husband 
remained absent for a period in excess of two years at any one time. 
The court now interpreted the rul e to mean that the husband should 
leave his place of employm e nt at the end of a two year absence, if 
he wished to avoid the consequences of a long se paration from his 
spous e . In this way good morals and public policy could be main-
tained, as the initial purpose of the l aw was to preserve marriages, 
19 
not to destroy them. 
The problem of administering justice among recently urban-
ized Africans, especially those working in the mines, is well illus-
trated in the approach used on the No rthern Rhodesian Copperbelt. 
In 1938 the British administration then ruling the territory set up 
the first Urban Native co urt s . These were made up of elders from 
the various tribe s represented at the mines, who were appointed by 
their chiefs. They served for two consec utive three year terms 
19 Max Gluckman, Order a nd Rebellion in Tribal Africa, p. 200. 
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with a six month leave period in between. After this time they were 
r equi red to resi gn . The co urt Pr esident , however , was appointed 
for his ex perie nc e and wisdom, for life, during good behavior. 
While the Br itish ruled Northern Rhodesia, these courts followed 
custom ary procedures, parties being permitted to tell their story 
11 
• •• unrestrained by European ru les of evide nce. 11 There is no 
indication as y et, that th is principle has in any way been altered 
since Independen ce. In the matter of sentencing, however, the 
influence of Anglo- l aw has been noticeable . Under customary la w 
there wa s rare ly any provi s ion made for impriso nment o f offend ers, 
and punishment normally took the form of compensation rather than 
retribution. No w (1957), "Fine or imprisonme nt is n ear ly always 
inflicted in addition to, or sometimes instead of compensation. '' 
Wher ea s fo rmerly the theft of, for examp le, a chicken, would 
r e sult in the def endant being ordered to pay the plaintiff two chickens 
or te n sh illings (the market value of two chickens, about $1. 40), now 
he might be ordered to pay the court half of that money in the form of 
20 
a fine, w hilst giving the plaintiff the remainder as compensation. 
Despite all the evidence to the cont rary, some historians and 
legal sch olars, have insisted that African law is not true law, but 
merely custom, as though that were an inher e nt fault. One of the 
20 
R. L. Moffat, "African Courts and N ative Customary Law 
in Urban Areas of No rth ern Rhod e sia," Journa l of A frican Adm inis-
trat io n, IX (A pril 1957), pp. 71- 79 . All quotations are cited from 
this arti cle. 
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major premises upon which this misconception is built, is that the 
African supposedly makes no distinction between criminal and civil 
torts (wrongs). This erroneous impress ion has been attributed to 
four major influenc es: 
1) The writings of Sir Henry Maine (Ancient Law and other 
works. ) 
2) Awarenes s on th e p art of histori cal writers of the evolu-
tion of the law in Europ e . 
3) The fallacy that criminal a nd civil law are always clear-
cut concepts in Europ ean te rms . 
4) The imputation that Afric a n law, because it is African, 
must necessarily b e different. 21 
On e often reads the dictum " ... all blood belongs to the chief, " 
which put anoth e r way simply means: crime s resulting in the death 
of a subject, whether accidental or inte ntional, are wrongs com-
mitted against the chief. He is the one who suffers most as a 
result of the l oss of manpower, and as the symbol of authority m a 
tribal system, he is closely analogous to the state in our terms. 
Thus it is the chief who receives compensation on the death of a 
subject, if the cause is a criminal one. This is only a short step in 
conc epti on from the Anglo-American system of law, in which the 
state prosecutes crimes and the individual prosecutes civil wrongs. 
The fact that many Bantu peoples have recognized this distinction 
without necessar il y institutionalizing it is illustrated well in the 
following quotation: 
21 . E has , p. 1 1 0. 
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The great principle of the Kafir law, wh ich though merely a 
traditional record of precedents, is toleraiJly clear and 
systematic, seems to be that a man's property is his own, 
but that his person is the Chief's. 22 
It should hardly b e necessary to add that our own common law is 
11merely a tradition a l record of precedents, 11 albeit a written one ; 
but which in other respects differs little from that of most Bantu 
societies. 
22 Thoma s Baines, Journal of Residence in Africa 1842-1853, 
ed R. F. Kennedy (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1961 ), p. 48. 
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V : THE STATUS OF LAW IN BANTU AFRICA TODAY 
Writing from so great a distance an d w ithout the ben efi t of 
on-th e - spo t investigations, it is extremely difficult to discuss thi s 
to pie with any assurance. There ar e , however, certain observable 
trends . 
In the first place, it is very clear that the traditional law 
o f the pe ople considered most closely no lo nger functions in qui te 
the same way as described in the s e cond cha pter . That is not to 
say it is not a vital force . The Afr ican does not appear to have lost 
his interest in or desire for protracted discus sion which was su gge st e d 
earlier as a bas is for litigation. But the co urts do not function in 
quite the same way as they once did. For y ea rs now men and wome n 
have been trave ling to Europe and No rth America in search of an 
education . M any of these have studied the law, and later returned to 
their home s to p ractice as lawyers, advocates, and judges. This 
process, though a part of colonial polic y, would probably have happened 
any wa y, possibly more vigorously in the absence of colonialism. 
However, what ever motivat e d this exodus in search of learning, it has 
and c ontinues to have a profound effect. The inevitable result has been 
the introduction of new p roc e dures to the legal machinery, and a con-
sid er ab l y expanded world-view for the people o f Afri c a. At the same 
41 
time the advent of colonialism itself introduced, some times forcibly, 
new concepts of the law and new methods of application. The colon-
ists not only intro duced new laws, but in changing the whole economy 
and life - style of the peoples whom they colonized, introduced new 
needs for the law both in terms of administration, requiring new and 
strange procedures, and in substance. The effect of this was not all 
negative. As has been shown, such matters as witch-murder, poly-
gamy, bride-wealth, were subject to review, sometimes with drastic 
thoroughness, which caused consid e rable alarm and dismay among 
the rural people especially. Yet on the other hand, the rising aspira-
tions of the younger people for the goods and amenities that their 
European conquerors enjoyed caused them to move to the towns in 
vast numbers, and created many n ew problems of a legal nature 
which somehow have had to be solved. It may be argued that this too 
was a primarily negative result of colonization. Be that as it may, 
the need for new rules and devices unknown and unnecessary in tradi-
tional Africa has become unquesti on able. 
But what of colonial law itself? In some respects its fate has 
not been dissimilar. Now that one can look back on the colonial 
period as a matter of history (noting of course, that such territories 
as Rhodesia, South Africa, and th e Portuguese possessions of Angola 
and Mozambique are still under colonial domination, at least if viewed 
through the eyes of the African people themselves), it is possible to 
make an assessment of the functioning of its remnants both in the 
territories named above as well as those whose independence is 
recognized. 
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First, with reg ard to procedures it is clear that the strong 
influence of Europ ean l egal procedures has persisted. No independent 
Bantu state has bani she d lawyers, advocates, magistrates, judges, 
clerks or the other various appendages of a professional judical 
system from their administrations. In fact, even the traditional 
garb of wigs and jud icial robes which always seemed so very stifling 
in the sub-tropical heat are still donned, though now the head under 
them is in all probability black, not white. Thus, too, the adminis -
tration of an oath prior to the givi n g of evidence is continued. Per-
jury is punishable and hearsay evidence is no longer admitted. 
Most important, by the very fact tha t a two-tier system of law still 
operates in such territories as Zambia, by which de-tribalized 
urban Africans and Europeans may choose to be tried according to 
one set of rules, namely the British Common Law, and rural or 
tribal Africans may choose to be judged by their own traditional codes 
of justice, indicates that the imposed British colonial law is held in 
some es teem. 
On the other hand, th ere are the substantive aspects of the 
law which 1·efer to what the law does as opposed to the way it does it. 
1 
Thomas, p . 471-477. 
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By now it should be appar e nt that the emerged Bantu African stat es, 
both those under African rule as well as those under white domination 
and especially the latter, are in the technological sense very much a 
part o f the twentieth century. Whether they like it or not, the cash 
economy has permeated the whole African continent. None, except 
maybe a few wandering bushmen in the northern Kalahari, are exempt 
from its influence or unaffected by its power. Thus most Bantu 
Africans, like their counterparts the world over, work for renumera-
tion in cash and as such are subject to most of the same economic 
pressures. Th is new status, we lcome or not, is unavoidable. And it 
carries with it many new responsibilities, or perhaps one should say 
a change in respo nsib ility. No lon ge r is the extended family, where 
three or more generati ons lived in c lose proxi mity to one another, a 
viable unit. The tw o generation fam ily of European origin has ta ke n 
its place. Thi s has de veloped a new sense of identity and individualism 
carrying with it the concept of indi v idual liability in terms of the law, 
a relatively new co ncept in Bantu Africa. No longer can it be said: 
"Owing to their collective, notions, the Bantu's consider relatives 
as responsible for the debts of their own kin . • , 11 and the law no 
2 
longer automa tically recognizes this claim. For better or for 
worse, the individual Bantu, whether he lives in the town or the 
country, whether he has maintained ties with his family or tribe or 
2 
Junod, p. 43 7 . 
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re jecte d both, has now, more than ever befo re to stand on his own. 
This is not to say that new institutions have not arisen to take the 
place of the family; they have. Most notable of these has been the 
formation of po litical parties and trade unions on the Western Europ-
ean pattern. But these associations a re not the same. They are, in 
the first place, freely e ntered and freely left, and they offer a less 
certain type of security than the family once did. At the same time 
the African who is exposed to this new situation experiences a shift 
m loyalty. No longer does he look to his father, headman, or chief 
for guidance in political, social or legal matters, but now to his 
foreman, union leader, or employer. Not only does his loyalty 
spectrum change, but at the same time so may his financial wealth 
and, therefore, his status as well. 
It has been sai d of primitive society that 11 law is generally 
linked with religion and political power. 11 In developed society, 
however, this is seldom the case. Thus, as the 11African becomes 
more Eu rop eanized so his political, social, and legal structures 
change. 11 Church and state are separated, and wealth no longer 
centers on the traditional leaders; but in fact mechanics, shopkeepers, 
and facto ry workers will outstrip their chiefs in terms of monetary 
3 
wealth. So that in time the African's id entificati on with his chief 
3 Godfrey and Monica Wilson, The Analysis of Social Change 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), f.P· 6-7. 
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and his chief's law diminishes, wh i le at the same time he comes to 
identify more and more with the new laws and mores that are more 
relevant to him in his changed circumstances. 
At this point it is well not to l ose sight of the fact that, as one 
c ommentator has put it " ... the ultimate purpose of the law in a 
so ciety, be it African or European, is to secure order and regularity 
in the conduct of human affairs and to e nsure the stability of the body 
1. . 4 po 1tic. 11 In other words it is not t h e funct ion or purpose of the law 
whic h has undergone c h a nge, but rather th e means by which the people 
of Bantu Africa seek to use the law . It would now seem reasonable to 
suggest that both the traditional and the colonial law of Bantu Africa 
have undergone change. Th ese changes both in procedure and sub -
stance are given ris e to a new but so far incomplete legal system. 
Just as in South Afric a for instance, the development of an Anglo-
Roman-Dutch law has been observed, so too in Zambia, one can see 
that an Anglo-Zambian- Common law is d evel oping. But the process 
is slow, and not always sure. The e videnc e of earlier chapters 
would suggest that in Sou th Africa , for instance, the law is being 
used as a means of perpetuating apartheid, not only through statutes 
which are obvious, but also throu g h the far more insidious procedure 
of maintaining a deliberately plurali stic system, in this way ensuring 
for all time separation of the laws (customary Bantu from European 
4
Elias , p. 268. 
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introduced), which at the same time guarantees that they will be 
5 
unequal. On the other side of the coin is Zambia. There, too, a 
pluralistic system is operated, recognizing both customary law and 
procedures and the European introduced law. The difference is in 
the ultimate authority which rests with the appeal courts, common 
to all jurisdictions. (Tha t is to say an appeal from any court, be it 
customary or Europe an, will be channeled through the appellate 
division, as compared to South Afri cc1. where separate jurisdictions 
for customary and European cases are maintained.) There is no 
doubt that this procedure is fraught wit h pitfalls, some of which 
have already b een highlighted. 6 But there is reason to expect that 
these problems will in time be ameliorated. 
Common-law w illingness to accomodate corporations (cor-
porate- bodies other than the state) allowed the British to 
deal freely with tribal units whose forms and boundaries 
they cou ld identify . . . [ be ca use] British law explicitly 7 
provide s legal recognition for autonomous corporations. 
So that while dualism or parallelism in the legal systems of Africa 
still persis ts, there is no reason why in time these should not vanish 
leavin g in their wake a new, dynamic, unified and peculiarly Afr ic an 
5 
R. S. Suttner, "Legal Pluralism in South Africa," The Inter-
national and Comparative Law QuarterJ.y XIX part 1 (January 1970) 
pp. 134-153. 
6 
Thomas, pp. 4 71-4 77. 
7 . M. G. Smith, "The Sociological Framework of Law," in Leo 
and Hilda Kuper, eds . African Law (Berkeley: University of California 
Pres s , 1 9 6 5 ) , pp . 4 6 - 4 7 . 
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8 
system of law. Some commentators wou l d e ve n argue that this has 
already happened. It has been suggested that: 
All laws in independent Africa are now 'African 1 , and African 
law no lon ger means simply in digenous customary laws 
deriving f~?m antiquity, but the modern statutory laws as 
we ll ... 
Such is no doubt a reasonable proposition . Our concern, however , is 
not only with the independent African states, but also with those that 
are under what amounts to a colonia l regime. Thus it cannot yet be 
said of the Bantu African Law that it is all Bantu . Not only is it not 
all Bantu, it may never be. Howev e r, there is little doubt that what-
ever eme rges in time, it will have m ore than the appearance of Bantu 
about it. 
8 Allott, " Th e Future of African Law," African Law, p. 223. 
9 Ibid . , p. 21 8 . 
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VI: CONCLUSIONS 
Probably the m ost fruitful way to view the traditional law of 
Bantu Africa is as a st age in the evolution of law. For the law , like 
the society it contr ols, is never static. New needs and innovations 
demand new contro ls a nd methods of control. The introduction of a 
cash economy, o f good s and consumer products undreamed of in 
another age, or relig io us teaching and a different vision of life, 
inevitably cau se e nor mou s upheaval to any traditional society with 
which they com e in contact. This is true of the European influence 
on Bantu socie ty no le ss than any othe r. The measure, therefore, 
of a society's vigour and its right to be regarded as socially deve-
lope d, which by implication means legall y developed too, should be 
determined by its adaptability to the n ew con ditions imposed upon 
it, rather than by some sub jecti ve assessme nt of what its traditional 
law is. Limit ed though the evid ence here presented is, it should 
nontheless su pport the premis e t hat Bantu society was in a sense 
developed prior to the Europea n o ccupation. It has managed to adapt 
to those concepts of t h e introdu ce d law most pertinent to its needs, 
while at the sam e time preserv ing its own customary laws where 
they are still viable. What the fut ure holds for the traditional law 
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o f t h e Ba ntu, only a soo thsaye r could predict. One th ing is certain, 
how eve r; it has so far demonstrated remarkable resilience, and 
whatever form finally emerges, it will have more than a mere 
smattering of tradition about it. 
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